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Taking Shareholders’ Social Preferences
Seriously: Confronting a New
Agency Problem
Adi Libson
Oliver Hart, Nobel Laureate in Economics for 2016, and
economist Luigi Zingales recently published an article justifying
companies’ pursuit of social objectives at the expense of profits from
within the shareholder primacy framework. This Article highlights an
important consequence of this approach: a new agency problem between
managers and shareholders regarding social preferences. This Article
provides two possible solutions to this agency problem: a bottom-up
solution focused on shareholders’ ability to submit proposals on such
issues and a top-down solution based on an independent board subcommittee intended to identify social objectives and forward them for
shareholder approval.
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INTRODUCTION
What should the objective of a corporation be? Should it focus exclusively on
maximizing profit, or should it promote other purposes, such as environmental
sustainability and social justice? This Article aims to emphasize the ramifications of
opting for the latter possibility: the new set of agency problems it generates, and
how they can be addressed.
The standard justification for promoting social objectives is the stakeholder
justification: many other stakeholders exist besides shareholders, such as workers,
lenders, and the community and society at large, and it is legitimate, and sometimes
imperative, that the corporation guide its actions in light of the interests of these
other stakeholders, rather than solely according to the interests of shareholders.1
Recently, an article by 2016 Nobel Laureate Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales justified
corporations’ pursuit of social goals independent of the stakeholder justification,

1. One of the earliest proponents of the stakeholder view was Merrick Dodd, in his well-known
dispute with Adolf Berle, the chief proponent of the shareholder primacy view. See E. Merrick Dodd,
Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); Adolf Berle, For Whom
Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932). A new wave in support of
the stakeholder view rose in the 1980s, in response to the takeover wave of the 1980s in the United
States. See R. Edward Freeman & David L. Reed, Stockholders and Stakeholders: A New Perspective on
Corporate Governance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 189 (C. Huizinga ed., 1983); see also R. EDWARD
FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (1984). The stakeholder theory
of corporate law became a common topic for legal symposia in the early 1990s. See Brian Langille &
Ronald Daniels, The Corporate Stakeholder Conference: Introduction, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 297 (1993);
David Millon, New Directions in Corporate Law: Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in
Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373 (1993). Scholarship in support of the stakeholder view
continues to be published to this day. See Justin Blount, Creating a Stakeholder Democracy Under Existing
Corporate Law, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 365 (2016); Iris Chiu, Operationalising a Stakeholder Conception in
Company Law, 10 L. & FIN. MKTS. REV. 173 (2016); Thomas A. Kochan & Saul A. Rubinstein, Toward
a Stakeholder Theory of the Firm: The Saturn Partnership, 11 ORG. SCI. 367 (2000); Lynn A. Stout, Bad
and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189 (2002).
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reinvigorating the debate regarding appropriate objectives for a corporation.2 The
authors argue that even if one accepts the shareholder primacy view—that the
objective of the corporation should be maximizing shareholder welfare, and
disregarding the interests of any other stakeholders—firms should not necessarily
pursue maximization of profits exclusively. Given that shareholders may have social
preferences besides maximization of profits, their welfare would be maximized only
if those preferences were also taken into account by managers and the board.3 As a
result, maximization of shareholder welfare necessitates the promotion of social
objectives at the expense of profits.4
This Article points to the consequences of accepting such a view—that
management should pursue social objectives when shareholders have such
preferences. It argues that there exists a systemic gap between managers and
shareholders regarding social preferences. While shareholders may be willing to
prioritize social preferences over profit maximization and sacrifice the latter for the
former, managers are less inclined to do so. Managers are much more sensitive to
profits than shareholders. This is for two reasons. The first is the nondiversification
of managers relative to shareholders. While shareholders are diversified in their
investments, with only a small portion of their physical capital typically invested in
one specific corporation, managers’ investments in the corporations they manage
are less diversified. Managers’ most valuable asset—human capital—is solely
invested in the corporation they manage. The market value of their managerial skills
is directly linked to the financial bottom line of the corporation.5
The second reason why managers are more sensitive to profits than
shareholders is bonding mechanisms, such as options and bonuses. Many managers
have such personal financial incentives, which increase their sensitivity to the
profitability of the corporation relative to shareholders.6
Because of this systemic gap between managers and shareholders, a
corporation’s decisions that have a significant impact on social matters, such as
environmental implications, should be delegated to shareholders to approve. While
Hart and Zingales discuss the need for delegation due to the possibility of a gap in

2. Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market
Value, 2 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 247 (2017).
3. Id. at 249–50.
4. As Hart and Zingales note, id. at 251, a version of their central argument has been previously
made. See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 740,
796 (2005). For a discussion of where their argument and the argument in this Article departs from
Elhauge, see infra Part IV.A.
5. For empirical evidence supporting the effect of past performance on CEO compensation,
see Rajiv D. Banker et al., The Relation Between CEO Compensation and Past Performance, 88
ACCT. REV. 1, 4 (2013); D.H. Chen et al., Executives and Employees: Comparison and Interaction of
Incentive Effectiveness, 5 MGMT. WORLD 160 (2015).
6. Their sensitivity to bottom line earnings may even be, in some instances, too strong, increasing
the likelihood of financial misreporting. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without
Performance: Overview of the Issues, 17 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 18 (2005); Peidan Hong, The Literature
Review on Compensation System Design, 8 MOD. ECON. 1119, 1124–25 (2017).
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the preferences of managers and shareholders,7 this Article—based on the systemic
gap in preferences—emphasizes the urgency of this delegation. In addressing this
urgent need, this Article offers two methods through which decisions on social
issues can be delegated to shareholders: a bottom-up model, through shareholder
proposals, and a top-down model, through an independent subcommittee on the
board that would delegate decisions regarding significant social issues to
shareholders.
It is worth noting that this agency problem is also relevant to the stakeholder
view of the corporation; managers may bend toward profit maximization even if it
does not serve the interest of any stakeholders, including the shareholders. Yet, the
problem is much more acute in the context of Hart and Zingales’s argument for
two reasons. The main reason is the dominance of the shareholder primacy view in
U.S. legal discourse.8 As a consequence, Hart and Zingales’s argument brings this
agency problem into the forefront of corporate policymaking. The second reason is
that the stakeholder view of the corporation has agency problems woven into its
basic structure: the corporation is supposed to benefit certain stakeholders that have
no control over its decision-making process. Under such a framework, identifying
an additional agency problem with shareholders is nearly superfluous.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I outlines Hart and Zingales’s argument
in favor of corporations engaging in pro-social initiatives from within the
shareholder primacy framework. Part II underscores the new agency problem that
arises between managers and shareholders if a corporation is supposed to pursue
social objectives in addition to financial objectives. Part II elaborates on the two
sources for this new agency problem: nondiversification of managers’ human
capital and the bonding mechanisms that make them too sensitive to the financial

7. Hart & Zingales, supra note 2, at 249–50.
8. The Delaware Supreme Court, which, in regards to corporate law, is the highest court of the
most important jurisdiction in the U.S., in which around half of U.S. corporations are incorporated,
seems to have accepted the shareholder primacy view. It had stated that “[t]he board of directors has
the legal responsibility to manage the business of a corporation for the benefit of its shareholder
owners.” Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 ( Del. 1998). In Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc., it held that “concern for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction among active
bidders is in progress, and the object no longer is to protect or maintain the corporate enterprise but to
sell it to the highest bidder.” Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182
( Del. 1986). It is true that even the Delaware Supreme Court has also permitted directors, in some
cases, to take decisions that seem to diverge from shareholders’ interests and benefit other
constituencies at their expense. See e.g., Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1140
( Del. 1989). Yet, as Lynn Stout has pointed out, they have done so using shareholder primacy rhetoric,
hoping that, in the long-run, it will also benefit the shareholders in some ways. See Lynn A. Stout, supra
note 1, at 1203. Many other scholars hold that the dominant view of the corporation’s purpose in the
U.S. is shareholder oriented, a view originally stated by Adolf Berle. Berle, supra note 1; see Ronald Chen
& Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103
MICH. L. REV. 1, 32 (2004); Virginia Harper Ho, “Enlightened Shareholder Value”: Corporate Governance
Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 72 (2010); Michael C. Jensen, Value
Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 89 (2001).
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bottom line of the corporation. Part III presents two forms of addressing this new
type of agency problem: the bottom-up form that enables individual shareholders
to make proposals on social issues, and the top-down form that establishes an
independent sub-committee on the board that identifies significant social issues and
delegates decisions on such issues to shareholders. Part IV discusses possible
objections to this analysis and proposed solutions. Part V concludes..
I. THE CASE FOR INCLUDING SOCIAL OBJECTIVES AS A NORMATIVELY
DESIRABLE OBJECTIVE OF THE CORPORATION
One of the fundamental questions regarding the purpose of a corporation is
whose interest the corporation is supposed to pursue. There are two schools that
provide an answer to this question. One view claims that corporations should
promote shareholder interests.9 The corporation is their property, as they provided
the capital to finance its initial activity.10 In addition, because shareholders are the
residual claimants—receiving their financial gain after other claimants such
as lenders and workers—those claimants’ aims are served by prioritizing
shareholders.11
The second school claims that corporations should promote the interests of
other stakeholders besides shareholders, such as workers, lenders, and even society
at large.12 One of the central arguments behind this claim is that equity is only one
input among many necessary for the corporation’s success, such as workers, lenders,
markets, development of human and physical resources by society, and so on. Thus,
there is no justification for corporations promoting the interests of only one
stakeholder that provides resources to the corporation—namely, the
shareholders—and not those of other contributing stakeholders.13
The first school has mostly dominated economic and legal scholarship.
Professor Milton Friedman has provided the most prominent formulation of the
view..14 Friedman argued that shareholder primacy and profit maximization were
inextricably connected. His central argument was a division of labor argument: even
if shareholders might have social objectives other than profit making, they could

9. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 2–5 (1991); MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962); Berle,
supra note 1. Friedman presented his views more sharply in a New York Times article: Milton Friedman,
Editorial, A Friedman Doctrine: The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 1970, at SM17. For the adoption of this view by courts and other scholars, see supra note 8.
10. Berle, supra note 1, at 1370.
11. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 9, at 36–39.
12. For examples of scholars supporting various versions of the stakeholder view, see supra
note 1.
13. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 247, 253 (1999).
14. FRIEDMAN, supra note 9.
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pursue those objectives elsewhere. The corporation maximizing profits would only
increase their ability to pursue other social objectives elsewhere.15
Hart and Zingales’s central aim is separating the shareholder primacy view
from Friedman’s maxim that corporations should strive to maximize profits. They
claim that given that shareholders have other social preferences, maximizing
shareholder welfare necessitates the corporation to pursue these social
preferences.16 Confining the corporation to pursue only some of the shareholders’
preferences will lead to a suboptimal welfare level for shareholders.17
Hart and Zingales contest Friedman’s argument that these social preferences
could be pursued outside the corporate context. They note that some ethical
activities are inseparable from corporate money-making activities, and thus
shareholders will only be able to pursue these social preferences in the corporate
context.18 This inseparability mostly stems from technological constraints: pursuing
some objectives requires technology that the corporation has and the individual
could not obtain without great cost.19
The central example provided is the shareholder derivative action Trinity Wall
Street v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., in which Walmart shareholders aimed to curb the
company’s sales of high-capacity assault rifles.20 The corporation’s restrictions on
sales of both guns and ammunition would clearly serve plaintiff shareholders’
preference to reduce the number of gun deaths in the United States. A shareholder
likely would not have a cost-effective alternative to confront the problem. The
meager amount of resources from the shareholders’ proportional share of the
company proceeds from the sale of this weapon cannot be employed in any other
significant way that would promote gun control. As further illustration, a
corporation’s pollution of a stream may not only cost a substantial amount to
restore, but consumers might not be able to completely offset the damage done by
the corporation.21
The alternative and more conventional method for the promotion of social
goals—governmental spending and regulation—may also be ineffective in many
cases. There may be political economic limitations that prevent the government
from acting in certain spheres or even constitutional limitations that do not exist in
the corporate sphere. For example, in Trinity Wall Street, gun and ammunition

15. Id. at 114.
16. Hart & Zingales, supra note 2, at 249.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 250.
19. Other scholars have also considered the possibility of non-separable activities. See Ronald
Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility, 77 Economica 1, 11–12 (2010);
Elhauge, supra note 4. Regarding other barriers facing the consideration of shareholder preferences,
such as institutional investors that seem to stray away from the preferences of shareholders in their
voting pattern on social shareholder resolutions, see Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions, 43
J. Corp. L. 217, 218 (2017).
20. Trinity Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323 (3d Cir. 2015).
21. Hart & Zingales, supra note 2, at 249.
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manufacturers may have an effective lobby for preventing legislative gun control,22
and the Second Amendment constitutionally limits gun control legislation.23
Restricting sales of weapons and ammunition on the corporate level may be the
most effective way to reach those results.
Affirmative action may serve as another example demonstrating the efficacy
of promoting social objectives at the corporate level, relative to state action. A
corporation may adopt a policy in which minorities and/or women are preferred
for certain jobs. Prioritization based on race or gender as an additional factor in the
hiring process may impose costs for the corporation under certain circumstances,
relative to decision-making based on maximization of revenue alone.24 Yet, aside
from the lighter constitutional limitations regarding race and gender affirmative
action in the private sphere relative to the public sphere, a state-imposed affirmative
action policy may engender racial tensions rather than work to move past them. In
contrast, private policies in the corporate context are less likely to elicit such strong
concerns.25 Furthermore, in extreme cases in which the social purpose of
affirmative action is not only promoting numerical equality across racial groups but
also enhancing the social stature and self-esteem of certain groups, such bottom-up
action may be much more effective than top-down affirmative action mandated by
the state. The enhancement of the minorities’ self-esteem may be much more
limited because it was imposed on employers to hire them. In contrast, in the private
corporate context, the affirmative action was adopted voluntarily and as such
reflects more appreciation and respect toward the individual, enhancing his selfrespect and self-esteem to a greater degree.26
If a shareholder wishes to promote a certain social objective at a certain cost,
and if the most effective way to promote that objective is through corporate action,
restricting the ability of the corporation to promote that objective decreases the
shareholder’s welfare level. If the overarching objective of the corporation is the
maximization of shareholder welfare, the corporation should be permitted to
22. Regarding the power and influence of the rifle lobby, see: JOSH SUGARMAN, NATIONAL
RIFLE ASSOCIATION: MONEY, FIREPOWER & FEAR 27 (1992).
23. For an example of a case in which the Supreme Court found a gun-safety regulation violating
the second amendment and struck it down, see District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 570 (2008)
(striking down a D.C. gun-safety regulation that required all rifles and shotguns to be kept unloaded
and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock because it determined that it violated the second
amendment).
24. For an argument regarding the economic costs of affirmative action, see RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS
396 (1992). Yet, there are scholars who disagree with the position that affirmative action in the
workplace will always impose a cost. See, e.g., Harry J. Holzer & David Neumark, What Does Affirmative
Action Do?, 53 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 240, 250–53 (2000).
25. Regarding the private/public distinction that applies to affirmative action at the workplace,
see Rebecca K. Lee, The future of Workplace Affirmative Action After Fisher, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 597,
612–18 (2016).
26. Regarding how the context in which a right or resource is conferred or given to an individual
impacts her dignity, see Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 310–
26 (1999).
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promote its shareholders’ social preferences and not necessarily required to
maximize profits.
In Hart and Zingales’s modeling of the argument, the corporation must decide
between two courses of action: whether to adopt a pro-social strategy, which they
label in the environmental context as the “clean” strategy for which the expected
profits are πclean; or a “dirty” strategy, in which the expected profits are πdirty, given
πdirty>πclean.27 The dirty action will impose an external cost for society that equals
d.28 A shareholder’s determination of whether the dirty strategy is worth more than
the clean strategy is determined by a weighted average of the private payoff and the
social cost. The model therefore hinges on the weight a shareholder attributes to
the impact of the action on society relative to his private gains from the investment.
The model assigns weights of λi for the social impact and (1 - λi) for the private
payoff given that by definition. Those weights will sum to 1 and 0< λi<1.29 Both
payoffs are also affected by the investor’s investment in the corporation (i.e., the
fraction of shares he holds, which is denoted by α1). As a result, a shareholder’s
payoff from the dirty action is weighted as follows:30
(1) (1 - λi) α1 πdirty + λi α1 (πdirty - d) = α1 (πdirty - λi d)
The parallel payoff from the clean action is:31
(2) (1 - λi) α1 πclean + λi α1 πclean = α1 πclean
Hart and Zingales conclude, therefore, that a shareholder will prefer clean over dirty
if:32
(3) πclean > πdirty - λi d
The main point of their model is to demonstrate why a rational agent may
prefer the clean strategy, even though it generates a lower personal payoff. It is
important to note that they limit the model to a certain type of payoff. Hart and
Zingales distinguish between decision payoffs and final payoffs: the payoff from
the active decision, which is not necessarily equal to the final payoff the agent
derives from the outcome of the decision.33 The main source of difference between
the two is the shareholder’s sense of responsibility: the sense of responsibility may
decrease his perceived payoff when making the decision, even though it has no
effect on the final outcome. Hart and Zingales assume that their model applies only
to decision payoffs when a shareholder feels responsible for a social cost. In
contrast, for final payoffs, the investor does not feel responsible for the social cost
and thus does not internalize or weigh it at all (i.e., λi = 0).34 The central motivation
for this problematic distinction is to explain why there may be an “amoral drift”—

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Hart & Zingales, supra note 2, at 252–53.
Id. at 252.
Id. at 253.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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tilting the corporation toward the dirty action, even when for most shareholders,
πclean > πdirty - λi d.35 This is because individuals with a lower λi could take over the
company by paying a higher price per share and shifting it toward a dirty course of
action that would increase profits. In Hart and Zingales’s framework, even though
shareholders typically internalize social costs and would prefer the clean action in
their decision payoff corporation, they may not be inclined—in a tender offer—to
internalize the acquirer’s likely preference for the dirty option and are willing to sell
their shares for the high price the acquirer is offering.36
The next Part will refute the need for this problematic distinction to explain
the disconnect between corporations’ dirty actions and shareholders’ preferences
for clean actions. It will underscore a more systemic mechanism that will tilt
corporations toward dirty actions, even with no risk of a potential takeover.
II. THE NEW AGENCY PROBLEM IN THE CONTEXT OF SOCIAL PREFERENCES
The last section has presented the argument for permitting corporations to
promote social objectives. Attributing such function to corporations gives rise to a
new agency problem. There is a systemic and significant gap between managers and
shareholders in the context of social preferences. Shareholders have a greater
tendency to prioritize social preferences over profit maximization, while managers
will have a tendency to prioritize profit maximization instead. The reason for this
is that managers are much more sensitive to profits than shareholders. While
managers’ benefit from social objectives is similar to that of shareholders, managers’
personal gain from every incremental increase in profits is much greater than that
of shareholders. Because managers have to forgo a greater amount of gain for the
same social benefit, they are more averse to promoting social preferences than
shareholders. As a consequence, even in cases in which shareholders are willing to
promote a social objective at the expense of profits, the corporation’s managers
may not implement the social objective even though it would maximize shareholder
welfare.
Why should managers be more sensitive to profits than shareholders? There
are two reasons for this: the nondiversification of managers relative to shareholders
and the bonding mechanisms that apply to management.
A. Nondiversification of Managers Relative to Shareholders
Most shareholders are diversified in their ownership of stock. Unlike
shareholders, though, the most valuable asset of managers—their human capital—
is nondiversified. Its value is pegged, to some extent, to the performance of the
corporation they manage. The value of their managerial skills on the market is

35. Id. at 255.
36. Id. at 256. Hart and Zingales are aware of the problematic distinction between shareholders’
calculation of decision payoffs and final payoffs, and they have a separate section in which they justify
the distinction. See id. at 266–70.
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strongly influenced by the financial bottom line of the corporations they have
managed.37 For shareholders, a decrease of the profits of the corporation is a
decrease in profits of one corporation out of the many that they hold in their
portfolio.38 For managers, though, the decrease in the profits of the corporation
has a much more significant impact on their financial condition and welfare. Thus,
management is likely to be more averse to promoting social objectives.39
For example, let us assume that a manager’s future earnings depend on their
corporation’s relative past performance in its sector. Their expected compensation
will increase by the same percentage the earnings of their corporation surpassed
average earnings.40 Let us assume that the corporation needs to decide whether to
spend $2 million to reduce pollution in their production process. If it spends the $2
million, it will have net profits of $10 million, and if it does not, it will have net
profits of $12 million. Excluding the past-performance component, the manager’s
expected future compensation is $1 million. If the average corporation in the sector
posted $10 million in profits, the company’s spending on pollution reduction will
make the manager ineligible for the performance bonus. Instead of $1.2 million due
to the past-performance component, their future compensation will be limited to
$1 million. The manager’s significant loss of 16.67% of their expected future
compensation will cause them to object to such spending. This is true even if the
manager is not planning to leave their present job; their expected compensation in
alternative positions will impact their bargaining position in their present job.41
B. Bonding Mechanism
One of the central mechanisms for addressing the conventional agency
problem—rooted in the managers’ preference for leisure over work in contrast to
the shareholders’ preference that the managers should work in order to maximize
profits—is through bonding mechanisms. In order to incentivize the manager to
put the corporation’s interests first, bonding mechanisms that increase a manager’s
37. See supra notes 5–6.
38. Since a study that demonstrated that a portfolio can reach 95% of the market’s
diversification by holding 32 stocks, most investment managers have compiled a portfolio of a
minimum of 30 stocks. See Lawrence Fisher & James H. Lorie, Some Studies of Variability of Returns on
Investments in Common Stocks, 43 J. BUS. 99, 117 (1970). In reality, most investors are even more
diversified, as they hold ETFs that enable them to be fully diversified relatively cheaply.
39. Regarding how the nondiversification of managers in comparison to shareholders may
cause them to diverge from shareholder preferences, see Guido Ferrarini et al., Executive Pay:
Convergence in Law and Practice Across the EU Corporate Governance Faultline, 4 J. CORP. L. STUD. 243,
251–52 (2004).
40. Regarding the practice of benchmarking relative to peers, see Charles M. Elson & Craig
K. Ferrere, Executive Superstars, Peer Groups, and Overcompensation: Cause, Effect, and Solution, 38
J. CORP. L. 487, 491 (2013).
41. The effect may be even more pronounced under a “winner takes all” compensation scheme
that rewards the leading manager in the sector with less sensitivity to the absolute level of earnings. In
such a context, even smaller spending may have a more significant impact on expected compensation
if it determines whether the manager is leading in his sector or not. Regarding the prevalence of this
compensation scheme, see Ferrarini et al., supra note 39, at 251–53.
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sensitivity to the success of the corporation have been introduced: options and
bonuses for reaching certain targets.42
When designing such bonding mechanisms, the main objective is to ensure
that managers will have greater investment in the financial performance of the
corporation. There is typically no concern that managers might be too sensitive to
the corporation’s financial performance: the greater managers’ sensitivity, the
better.43 This situation changes, though, when shareholders’ social preferences are
accounted for. In such a scenario, there may be a situation in which a manager’s
concern with the financial outcomes is too strong. Options and bonuses create
powerful incentives and extreme sensitivity to profit levels. In some cases they may
generate “cliffs”: if profits cross a certain point, the manager receives a windfall,
but if they do not, even barely, the manager gets nothing.44 In the case of bonuses,
an increase of a dollar in a corporation’s revenue may increase a manager’s bonus
by far more than a dollar.45
For example, let us assume that a manager is offered a bonus of $100,000 if
they pass a threshold of $10 million of revenue per quarter. Assume that the
marginal cost of every unit sold is half of its price. If revenue has crossed $9.85
million, the additional revenue of $150,000 will increase the manager’s
compensation by $100,000 while generating a net loss for the corporation: an
increase of $75,000 in profits ($150,000 in revenue minus direct costs of $75,000)
and the payment of the $100,000 bonus to manager. Given their incentives, the
manager will be overly eager to increase sales, and may use environmentally “dirty”
techniques, such as having salesmen driving door to door and increasing the fuel

42. See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives,
98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 226 (1990). Regarding optimal design of payment for performance, see Bebchuk
& Fried, supra note 6, at 19–23.
43. There have been some claims that incentives for managers to generate profits may be too
strong in respect to managing earnings. See supra note 6. There has also been some concern that
performance-based payment may provide strong incentives for the short-run at the expense of the longrun. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 6, at 18. But the point here is not that the incentive provided for the
short-term may be too strong and at the expense of long-run incentives, but that performance-based
incentives may be too strong in general.
44. Regarding the excessive risks of cliffs that will misalign managers with stockholders, see
Yisong S. Tian, Too Much of a Good Incentive? The Case of Executive Stock Options, 28 J. BANKING &
FIN. 1225, 1225 (2004) (arguing that when option wealth exceeds a certain fraction of total wealth,
adding more options only decreases incentives to increase stock price); Zhiyong Dong et al., Do
Executive Stock Options Induce Excessive Risk Taking?, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 2518, 2518 (2010)
(arguing that options may induce managers to tilt toward debt finance, even when it is a suboptimal
finance structure for corporations and shareholders).
45. Even though this form of compensation means that a certain increase in revenue may cause
a net loss to the company, it may still be an efficient form of compensation. Similarly to “tournament
theory,” it is possible that the most efficient form of compensation is one in which the employee
receives a sum above his marginal product. See supra notes 39 and 41. Similar to a lottery, there may a
low likelihood of reaching a certain threshold. Providing compensation for reaching a threshold that is
greater than the marginal product is a powerful incentive to the employee to increase productivity, even
though a smaller increase in productivity will not qualify for any bonus.
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consumption of the company, even though shareholders want the company to
become greener and consume less fuel.
This is an extreme illustration, one in which managers are extremely sensitive
to an increase in their corporation’s profits. This does not necessarily have to be
the case in order for the gap between the interests of managers and shareholders to
take place. It is sufficient that the managers’ interest in increased profits is
significantly higher than stockholders’. Consider Company ABC, which has one
million shareholders, and the value of each shareholder’s stock is $10. All
shareholders have a portfolio of $10,000, thus the value of their stocks in ABC
constitutes 0.1% of their portfolio. The board offers the manager 1,000 stock
options; each option enables them to buy 100 stocks of the company for $12 a
share. The strike date for the options is one year from when they receive the options,
and they cannot sell the options to a third party. These options will be valuable only
if the value of the corporation increases by over 20% in one year. If it does, the
manager will be entitled to approximately 9% of the value of the increase over
20%.46
ABC faces a decision: whether to shift to using a cleaner form of fuel. Shifting
to the cleaner fuel will impose an additional cost of $500,000. The new manager
expects to increase the value of the corporation by 30% in a year, increasing its value
by $3 million. If the company decides to use the cleaner fuel, the expected increase
in the value of the corporation will be only $2.5 million. The expected financial
implication of such a decision would be halving her bonus: from an expected
$90,000 to an expected $45,000. This is a very strong financial impact for her,
especially if the bonus is a large component in her compensation package. Thus, the
manager will be strongly against the decision to shift to the cleaner fuel, although
she may have general sympathy to environmental issues. The financial price she
would have to pay to promote the environmental cause is just too heavy.
The situation is different for shareholders. They too will pay a financial price
for the environmental decision to move to clean fuel. Their expected gain will
decrease from 29.1% to 24.55%. They will bear an effective decrease of 46¢ in the
value of the stock of the company they hold. The effect of such a decision on their
portfolio would be meager, decreasing its value by 0.0005%. Even if both managers
and shareholders value environmental issues to the same extent, their preferences

46. In case they exercise the options, there will be 1.1 million shares. If the value of the
corporation is 12 million dollars, exercising the option has no economic impact on existing
shareholders: their stake in the company has been reduced by the value of the company that has been
increased proportionally by the proceeds the company received for the stock. Existing shareholders
“pay a price” for the exercising of the options proportionate to the increase of the stock over the strike
price of the option. For every marginal dollar increase in the stock’s value over 12, they will bear a cost
of 9 cents for exercising the options: the company does not get anything for the value of the stock
above 12. A portion of the increase in value, which originally would go only to existing stockholders,
will have to be shared with the party exercising the options: only 91 percent of it will go to original
shareholders (1 million from the 1.1 million current stocks of the company). The other nine percent
will accrue to the party exercising the options.
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here will diverge if the value they attribute to such policy is in the wide range
between 46¢ and $45,000, as shareholders will prefer to switch while managers will
prefer not to switch.
It should be noted that in most cases, the value gap between shareholders and
managers is not as large as described above. The shareholders’ preference to opt for
the green option is not relevant only to Company ABC but also may be relevant to
other companies that form part of their portfolio. Thus, the real cost for the
decision to opt for clean fuel is not only 46¢. As this decision may pertain to many
other companies in their portfolio, the cost may be substantially higher. Yet this
point does not alter the analysis above. Even if cleaner fuel were relevant to all the
companies in their portfolio, the cost of opting for such an option across all
companies would be $455. This is still a much smaller number than the $45,000 cost
to the manager. And in reality, the cost for shareholders with diversified portfolios
will never reach this amount, as any individual issue and its inseparability from
business activity is unlikely to be relevant to all corporations. In any case, this
example clarifies why there is a systemic gap between managers and shareholders
regarding their willingness to trade off a corporation’s profits for a social objective.
In terms of Hart and Zingales’s model, the argument above could be modeled
in the following way. Its key point is that there are two types of λ: λi—the weight
investors attribute to social costs—and λm—the weight managers (and other insiders,
including board members) attribute to social cost. The weight is not identical to
individuals in both spheres, but the weight of the latter is typically higher than the
weight of the former:
(4) λ
λ
As equation (3) demonstrates in the Hart-Zingales model, α does not have an
effect on the decision whether to opt for the dirty or clean course of action because
it equally impacts the payoffs of both courses of action. This will make it simpler to
compare to the decision of a manager and his affiliates, who are not impacted
directly by the shares he owns. So, for modeling the decision of the manager and
his affiliates, we use only λ and omit α. The model for the decision facing the
manager, similar to that of the investor in equation (1) above, will be
(5) (1 - λm) πdirty + λm (πdirty - d).
As a result, even in instances in which the investor would prefer a clean course of
action, i.e.,
(6) πclean > πdirty - λi d,
the manager and his affiliates would prefer the dirty course of action. This is
reflected in equation (4), from which it could be derived that
(7) λi > λm,
and as a result, it is plausible, although not necessary, that
(8) πdirty - λm d > πclean > πdirty - λi d.
In other words, managers and their affiliates would choose the dirty course of action
even though investors would choose a clean course of action.
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In order to achieve this result—the inherent likelihood that managers and their
affiliates may resist social policies preferred by shareholders—there is no need for
the distinction made by Hart and Zingales between decision payoffs and final
payoffs and no need to focus solely on cases in which there is a potential takeover.
This result applies to all corporations, more generally than Hart and Zingales have
claimed in their model.
III. ADDRESSING THE NEW AGENCY PROBLEM
Enabling corporations to promote the social preferences of their shareholders
will require overcoming this agency problem of managers that are systematically
reluctant to pursue such policies. The best solution for overcoming the problem is
delegating decisions that involve potential social implications to shareholders.47 This
Part will discuss how this should be done.
While suggestions to delegate decision-making on social matters to
shareholders have been made and partially discussed by Hart and Zingales,48 the
systematic gap between managers and stockholders underscored in this Article turn
these suggestions from mere possibility to necessity. This delegation is not worth
considering because there may be differences between managers and stockholders;
the systemic gap requires shifting decision-making on these matters from managers
to shareholders.
Delegation of decision-making on social matters is the only effective way to
address the agency problem that arises in the context of these matters. Other
vehicles for mitigating this agency problem will not be as effective. When faced with
the conventional agency problem between shareholders and managers, the vehicles
lawyers, industry actors, and scholars have proposed are legal duties—such as the
duties of loyalty;49 institutional investors;50 independent directors and boards’

47. The discussion here regarding increasing shareholder input on certain issues is reminiscent
of the discussion by Bebchuk and Jackson on increasing shareholder input on corporate political
speech. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124
HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010). They even point out the relevance of their argument to social issues implicated
in this Article, such as corporate charitable contributions. See id. at 91 n.21. Yet, there is a significant
difference between the grounds for increasing shareholder involvement in their article and the one in
this Article. They point to the importance of the issues at hand and to the fact that they are not
necessarily connected to the corporations’ core business, without pointing to a systematic gap between
shareholders and managers on those issues. Id. at 89–91. This Article goes a step further and points to
the systematic gap between the preferences of shareholders and managers serving as a stronger
justification for increasing the input of shareholders on such issues.
48. Hart & Zingales, supra note 2, at 264.
49. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 34 (Aspen Publishers, Inc. 1986); Zohar
Goshen, Controlling Corporate Agency Costs: A United States-Israeli Comparative View, 6 CARDOZO
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99 (1998); Kenneth E. Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute
Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1983).
50. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice,
39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 819 (1992). In 2003, the SEC adopted rules that required mutual funds to
develop policies and procedures with respect to voting shares in their portfolio companies and
disclosing their votes on an annual basis. 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.30b1-4; 275.206(4)-6 (2003).
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independent special committees51 and facilitation of direct engagement of
shareholders.52 The first two proposals cannot effectively address the agency
problem in the context of social issues, which leaves only the latter two as viable
options for addressing this agency problem. This Part will explore the latter two
options after discussing why the former two will be ineffective.
The imposition of an enforceable duty of loyalty under which managers are
obligated to serve the interests of shareholders will be difficult to implement in the
social context: in order to make an allegation that the officers have diverged from
the best interests of the shareholders, there must be a clear picture of what the best
interests of shareholders actually are. Given the wide array of possible objectives of
shareholders when admitting social goals, it is hard to determine whether officers
have actually diverged from the shareholders’ interest as a whole. Indeed, even
under the premise that the only legitimate objective is profit maximization, it is quite
complicated to determine if officers have diverged from this goal.53 It is much more
complicated to make such a determination when it could implicate a wide array of
objectives.
Institutional investors—who have greater resources and expertise for
monitoring managers—can reduce this agency problem at the margins, though they
do not address the core issue: shareholders’ preference ranking of different social
objectives. There may be funds with a social agenda in which the investor can invest
and promote some social objective besides profit maximization. A few examples of
such funds are Parnassus Endeavor,54 Eventide Gilead,55 and funds that invest in
indexes of socially responsible corporations, such as the Vanguard FTSE Social
Index.56 Even major conventional funds typically have solid commitments to
51. Regarding the historical shift toward independent directors, see Jeffery N. Gordon, The Rise
of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices,
59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007).
52. There are other mechanisms for addressing agency problems, such as hedge fund activism.
See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure,
2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39, 47–49 (2012); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffery N. Gordon, The
Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 863, 896–901 (2013). Contra Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in
Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1028–41 (2007). Aside from the
dispute regarding whether hedge funds actually diminish agency problems or might exacerbate them,
they are not relevant to the context of social objectives. It may seem that other private actors, such as
Trinity Wall Street in the Walmart case, have a similar function in this context, but this is not accurate.
The power of hedge funds is mostly derived from the tendency of institutional investors to support
their campaign. This is not the case for social private funds. Hirst, supra note 19. For this reason, social
private funds should not be treated differently from any other shareholder, regardless of their size.
53. Elhauge, supra note 4, at 776–82.
54. Parnasus Endeavor Fund, PARNASSUS INV., https://www.parnassus.com/parnassusmutual-funds/endeavor/investor-shares/[ https://perma.cc/8UFC-UZBH] ( last visited Mar. 3, 2019).
55. Eventide Gilead, EVENTIDE FUNDS, https://www.eventidefunds.com/our-products/
[ https://perma.cc/HMN7-YTDW] ( last visited Mar. 3, 2019).
56. Vanguard FTSE Social Index Fund Investor Shares, VANGUARD GROUP,
https://personal.vanguard.com/us/FundsSnapshot?FundId=0213&FundIntExt=INT&funds_disable_
redirect=true [ https://perma.cc/V7GW-2RYK] ( last visited Mar. 3, 2019).
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sustainable investing, such as the California Public Employees Retirement System
(CalPERS).57 But without direct shareholder engagement, these funds are not
chosen to reflect shareholder preferences. A fund devoted to environmental issues
may not necessarily match the preferences of the investor; it may be more or less
willing to forgo profit maximization for environmental benefits or even value
specific environmental benefits differently. When taking into account a wider
dimension of issues, including gender equality, gun control, and wealth
redistribution, it is even less likely that the fund’s preferences will match those of
the investor, particularly given the interplay between various social issues.
Furthermore, most socially responsible institutional investment funds do not
engage with the corporation in order to promote and reflect its values, but instead
divest stock of corporations that do not function in accordance with their own
values.58 Thus, institutional investors—as actors removed from the shareholders—
are an ineffective tool for steering the corporation from one decision to the other.59
There are two alternative methods in which decision-making regarding social
objectives can take place: a bottom-up model, through shareholder proposals
regarding these issues, and a top-down model, mandating the board to bring certain
issues to a shareholder vote. Both forms will be discussed, as well as their
relationship to one another.
A. Bottom-up: Shareholder Proposals Regarding Social Issues
Shareholder proposals are a promising mechanism for enabling stockholders
to voice their social preferences. Shareholders have the right under Rule 14a-8 to
include their proposals in the company’s proxy materials.60 These proposals can be
related to any “general economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar

57. Sustainable Investing, CALPERS, https://www.calpers.ca.gov/page/investments/
governance/sustainable-investing [ https://perma.cc/W3JB-58G9] (last visited Mar. 3, 2019).
58. Hart & Zingales, supra note 2, at 266.
59. In addition to the information problem that institutional investors do not know the
preferences of their shareholders, there might be an agency problem between institutional investors and
their shareholders, even when institutional investors are aware of the preferences of their shareholders.
As a general matter, retail investor support for shareholder social proposals has been found to be 70%,
and the support of institutional investors in the same study was 27.6%. There is no reason to think that
there is a systemic difference between the preferences of retail shareholders and investors in those
institutional investors, supporting the claim that there may be gap in the preferences of the institutions
themselves and their investors. See Hirst, supra note 19.
60. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1998).
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causes.”61 Such proposals are actually used for a wide array of issues: gun control,62
discrimination,63 environmental justice,64 and social justice.65
Yet, there is one impediment for the use of shareholder proposals to reflect
shareholders’ preferences regarding social issues. Rule 14a-8(i)(3) enables the
corporation to exclude proposals “if the proposal deals with a matter relating to the
company’s ordinary business operations.”66 This exclusion is fairly wide, and it
enables the corporation to exclude many public policy proposals. As some scholars
have noted, this exclusion stands in tension with the permission granted to public
policy proposals, with one even naming it “a near-perfect bureaucratic Catch-22.”67
This problem is sufficiently severe that the Securities and Exchange Commission
has drafted a proposal that would explicitly limit the exclusion regarding public
policy proposals to apply only when they involve micromanaging proposals.68
The Capital Cities/ABC Inc. case provides an example for how the ordinary
business exclusion reduces shareholders’ ability to make public policy proposals.69
Shareholders in that case proposed that the company would provide information
regarding the composition of its workforce and employment practices, especially in
terms of sex and race. The company excluded the proposal from its proxy, claiming
that the proposal pertained to ordinary business, and was backed by the SEC.70 The
Commission reaffirmed its position that employment-related proposals should be
classified as pertaining to the company’s ordinary business and excluded a proposal

61. Proposed Proxy Rules, 36 Fed. Reg. 25,432, 25,432-33 (proposed Dec. 31, 1971) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). The SEC instituted this change in reaction to Campaign GM, in which
shareholders submitted proposals for the creation of a social responsibility committee. GM excluded
the proposal, arguing that such considerations were irrelevant to the corporation’s function. The SEC
required the inclusion of the proposal and changed the regulation in order to clarify that such a proposal
should not be excluded unless completely detached from the business of the issuer. See Donald
Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 MICH. L. REV. 419, 421,
423 (1971).
62. See supra note 20 and accompanying text; see also Shareholder Proposal Developments During
the 2015 Proxy Season, GIBSON DUNN ( July 15, 2015), https://www.gibsondunn.com/shareholderproposal-developments-during-the-2015-proxy-season/ [ https://perma.cc/R6B3-LY5R].
63. Thirty-four diversity-related proposals have been submitted by shareholders in the 2017
proxy season. See Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2017 Proxy Season, GIBSON DUNN
( June 29, 2017), https://www.gibsondunn.com/shareholder-proposal-developments-during-the-2017proxy-season/ [ https://perma.cc/76Q7-BBCE]. In addition, nineteen proposals regarding pay gaps
have been proposed. Id.
64. One hundred forty-four environmental proposals have been submitted by shareholders in
the 2017 proxy season, of which three have actually been approved by the majority of the shareholders.
Id.
65. Fourteen proposals regarding pay disparity have been submitted during the 2017 proxy
season. Id.
66. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–8(i)(7) (2018).
67. See Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit
Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REV. 879, 892 (1994).
68. Procedural Requirements for Proponents—Rule 14a–8, 41 Fed. Reg. 29,982, 29,984
(proposed July 20, 1976) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
69. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 178633 (Apr. 4, 1991).
70. Id.
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from the proxy in a similar decision regarding Cracker Barrel.71 However, the SEC
has retracted a bit from this apparent blanket limitation on proposals regarding
employment by redefining “ordinary business” as excluding issues that “would
transcend the day-to-day business matters and raise policy issues” that are of
“widespread public debate.”72 While this change of view has enabled shareholders
to raise employment issues in proposals, it has not diminished uncertainty regarding
the boundaries between public issues and ordinary business on this issue or within
other subjects, in what has been described as “an interpretive nightmare.”73
The uncertainty generated by the ordinary business criterion is a serious
problem. But there is a much bigger problem regarding this criterion: that in light
of the justification for why corporations should promote social objectives, it is
plainly wrong. Shareholder proposals are a means by which shareholders can impact
the corporation to promote the social objective they support. The central
justification for why they should promote these social objectives through the
corporation in which they own shares, and not privately, is that these social
objectives are inseparable from the corporations’ activities.74 It follows that the
preference of the shareholder pertaining to the ordinary business course of the
corporation only reinforces the case for permitting to surface it and does not serve
as a reason to exclude it. The more a certain social objective is inseparable from the
corporation’s business activity, the stronger the justification that it should be
executed by the corporation. The main reason that a social objective is inseparable
from the corporation’s business activity is that there is a synergy between the
corporation’s business activity and the promotion of the social objective.75 One
would expect to find greater synergies as the two are combined more strongly
together. The strongest combination is when the social objective is woven into the
heart of the corporation’s business activity—its ordinary business.76 Thus, the set
of cases where one might expect the rationale for promoting social objectives by
the corporation to be the strongest are exactly the set of cases in which promoting
social objectives is strongly restricted under the current rule.
71. Cracker Barrel Old Country Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 WL 289095 (Oct. 13,
1992).
72. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,106, 29,108 (May 28,
1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
73. Adrien K. Anderson, The Policy of Determining Significant Policy Under Rule 14a-8(i)(7), 93
DENV. L. REV. ONLINE 183, 196 (2016).
74. Supra note 19.
75. See Aseem Kaul & Jiao Luo, An Economic Case for CSR: The Comparative Efficiency of ForProfit Corporations in Meeting Consumer Demand for Social Goods, 39 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1650, 1651
(2018). Kaul and Luo focus on the competitive advantage of business to provide the public good at a
lower cost, but the competitive advantage can also apply to producing a good of higher quality.
Examples of high-quality public goods that businesses can produce more effectively than the
government include Microsoft’s partnership with the American Association of Community Colleges in
forming an education program for IT workers or Marriott’s paid classroom and on-the-job training for
unemployed individuals. See Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy & Society: The Link Between
Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV. 78, 89 (2006).
76. Kaul & Luo, supra note 75, at 1662–63; Porter & Kramer, supra note 75, at 88–89.
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The case of proposals promoting gender and racial equality provides a sharp
example. The Commission has restricted proposals regarding employment policy
because such proposals pertain to the core of the corporation’s ordinary business.
It is true that employment policy pertains to the corporation’s ordinary business,
but that is exactly what makes the promotion of that goal in the corporate context
the most effective way to promote it. One of the key aspects of gender and racial
equality is preserving the dignity of disadvantaged individuals who suffer from
discrimination. It is possible to compensate them for the disadvantages and provide
them with cash grants either in the private or public sphere. But such compensation
may only further infringe their dignity by underscoring their inferiority to others.77
Thus, the most effective way to promote equality and preserve disadvantaged
individuals’ dignity is supposedly in ways that emphasize their value, such as hiring
them. In this respect, a voluntary commitment of a corporation to hire them is much
more valuable than a mandate by the State that requires a corporation to hire them.
With respect to the objective of enhancing their dignity, a legal mandate may be
self-defeating: hiring as a consequence of a forced mandate by the State does not
emphasize the value of the individuals from these classes and may even backfire.78
The Walmart gun prevention case is an additional example of how promoting
social objectives in the context of ordinary business may generate the desired
benefit most effectively.79 The decision of which products to sell in Walmart stores
among the millions of products it sells is a pure ordinary business decision. This is
why the Third Circuit validated the exclusion of the shareholder proposal.80 Yet, it
is exactly this business function that controls the gun prevention objective. If
Walmart were no longer ordinarily involved in the selling of high-capacity
magazines and weapons, those weapons’ availability would decrease. As Hart and
Zingales have noted, this may be the most effective way to promote the objective.81
Since the State may be constitutionally prohibited from imposing shareholders’
desired limitations, the corporation controls the most effective target for promoting
that goal—distribution—and in many cases this target is tied inherently to the
corporation’s ordinary business.82
These examples illustrate how the ordinary business context may be the most
effective venue for integrating business and social objectives. If shareholder
proposals are the mechanism through which shareholders would be able to express
their social preferences, the ordinary business limitation must be eliminated. Other
scholars have made arguments against the ordinary business limitation,83 and
77. LAWRENCE MEAD, THE NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY: THE NONWORKING POOR IN
AMERICA 194 (1992); Anderson, supra note 26; Frank Munger, Dependency by Law: Poverty, Identity and
Welfare Privatization, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 391, 410 (2006).
78. Munger, supra note 77.
79. Trinity Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323 (3d Cir. 2015).
80. Id. at 344–45.
81. Hart & Zingales, supra note 2, at 249.
82. Id.
83. See supra notes 67, 73.
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proposals have been made unsuccessfully by the SEC.84 This Article adds an
additional argument as to why the limitation should be repealed in the context of
social proposals.
While this argument does state that the range of shareholder social proposals
should be extended to ordinary business issues, it does not intend that shareholder
proposals should not be restricted. On the contrary, it may support some
restrictions that other scholars have been opposed to. An example is proposals
related to risk. In 2005, the SEC applied the ordinary business limitation to
proposals dealing with risk issues that focus on “an internal assessment of the risks
or liabilities that the company faces as a result of its operation that may adversely
affect the environment or the public’s health.”85 Yet in 2008, it retreated from this
ruling, stating that the limitation may have been too broad, causing an “unwarranted
exclusion of proposals that relate to the evaluation of risk but . . . focus on
significant policy issues.”86
With respect to proposals regarding financial risks and liabilities, the
implications of the Article’s argument would conflict with the SEC’s decision. The
SEC would apply the ordinary business limitation to proposals regarding these
issues. If the main function of shareholder proposals is surfacing preferences in
which there is a potential systemic gap between shareholders and managers,87 the
ordinary business limitation should not apply to issues regarding financial risks. On
issues that impact the corporation’s financial bottom line, there is no systemic gap
between shareholders and managers. The fact that managers address certain risks in
ways that some shareholders disagree with is not due to a systemic disregard for
financial risks but because their assessment of the risks differs from those of the
specific shareholders making the proposal. A proposal based on a differing view
from management’s professional assessment of the financial risks facing the
corporation should be covered by the ordinary business limitation. It secondguesses management’s discretion regarding the corporation’s core business issues,
where there is no systemic gap between shareholders and managers that leads to a
misalignment of preferences.88

84. Procedural Requirements for Proponents—Rule 14a–8, 41 Fed. Reg. at 29,982, 29,984.
85. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14C (CF), ( June 28, 2005); see also Appendix ( listing Staff
letters permitting inclusion of proposals regarding health and environmental concerns and
consequences from 2000 to 2007).
86. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14E (CF) (Oct. 27, 2009).
87. See supra note 19.
88. Some scholars note that there is also a systemic gap in the preferences of stockholders and
managers towards risk, but that gap is in the opposite direction—managers are more risk-averse because
of their low diversification and stockholders are risk-lovers because of their diversification. See Yakov
Amihud & Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers, 12 BELL
J. ECON. 605 (1981); Goshen, supra note 49, at 103. Yet, shareholder proposals regarding risks do not
stem from this gap—shareholder proposals are mostly for decreasing rather than increasing risk. See
GIBSON DUNN, supra note 63.
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B. Top-down: Board Committee that Identifies and Delegates Social Matters
to Shareholders
An alternative to relying on shareholder proposals is establishing a committee
on the board, one which identifies potential significant social issues that
shareholders would be interested in promoting even at the expense of profits. The
committee would not make unilateral decisions regarding these issues but would call
for shareholder input before making decisions on the issues. Even if the committee
is fully independent, it could not make the decision itself because the appropriate
decision depends on the preferences of the shareholders.
There are two forms in which the committee could channel the input of
shareholders. The first is through a formal vote—with proxy material and all other
formalities. Such a vote would be binding and would require the corporation to act
according to the outcome of the vote. The second is through an informal vote. The
committee can choose to poll only a fraction of shareholders to get an impression
of their preferences regarding the social issue. This informal procedure is much
cheaper because it neither requires proxy materials nor attempts to reach all
shareholders. This form, therefore, suits decisions that must be executed in a short
time frame. It is also a more fitting form for treating shareholder feedback as nonbinding.
Soliciting shareholder preferences, even when these preferences are nonbinding, may still be an effective tool for prescribing the corporation’s actions. This
can be a similar mechanism to that of say-on-pay, in which stockholders voice their
view regarding compensation packages and affect compensation decisions even
though their views regarding the compensation package are non-binding.89 Using a
“soft-law” reputational device may be especially fitting in the case of determining
the actions a corporation should take in order to promote a certain goal. In complex
situations, an inflexible rule to determine what course of action should be taken is
ineffective. In such situations, it is better to utilize softer mechanisms.90 This is the
ground for excluding shareholders’ proposals regarding ordinary business activity;
business decisions are highly context-sensitive, and thus, determining by a simple
maxim how the corporation should act is not appropriate.91 Setting a vague principle
is also impractical and costly, requiring the regulator to constantly be involved in
“elaboration costs.”92 Thus, a reputational device, such as a non-formal vote or poll
of shareholders, may be especially appropriate in the context of providing the
corporation with the objective it should strive to promote; it leaves some flexibility

89. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229, 240, 249 (2003).
90. Poonam Puri & Simon Kupi, Say on Pay, Soft Law and the Regulatory Focus on Enforcement
and Transparency, in THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE AND THE
ROLE OF SOFT LAW 172, 185 (Friedl Weiss & Armin J. Kammel eds., 2015).
91. Id.
92. Julia Black et al., Making a Success of Principles-Based Regulation, LAW & FIN. MKT. REV., 191,
201 (2007).
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for the corporation but makes it fully accountable for unjustified ignorance of
shareholder preferences.93
Soliciting shareholder preferences may have an additional effect to the
reputational one: it may give rise to a duty of loyalty and duty of care for directors
and managers to pursue the objective the shareholders have expressed. Managers
and officers owe a duty of loyalty and duty of care toward the corporation. But
under the shareholder primacy framework, the ultimate goal of the corporation is
to promote shareholder welfare. Unless shareholders voice special preferences, it is
assumed that their preference—and as a consequence, the corporation’s objective
that the managers and directors have a duty to promote—is maximization of
profits. When they express other preferences, this may also affect managers’ duty
of care and duty of loyalty, which may now require them to promote the objective
expressed by the shareholders. It may be possible that the managers will be liable
even if they maximize profits, if they neglect the objectives expressed by the
shareholders.94 It is certainly possible that the expressed preference of the
shareholders will alter the substance of the duty of care and duty of loyalty. Yet the
actual effect of such change is quite questionable. Even when there is one clear
objective—maximization of profits—the business judgment rule virtually nullifies
the duty of care, making it impractical to impose liability as a consequence of
violation of the duty.95 The business judgment rule will most likely apply to some
extent in cases in which the manager has pursued certain interests of shareholders,
such as maximization of profits, but not their ultimate interests, such as promotion
of social objectives. Thus, it would be highly unlikely that any liability will be
imposed on managers and directors based on shareholders voicing their
preferences.
The function of the committee proposed here is different from that of a
standard social responsibility committee. The function of a standard social
responsibility committee is to engage the corporation in as many social activities as
is feasible.96 The performance of such committees is evaluated in accordance to the
amount of social activities the corporation engages with: the more, the merrier.97
For example, studies evaluating the efficacy of social responsibility committees have
used the listing of the corporation on the Dow Jones Sustainability Index as a proxy
for its efficacy.98 The inclusion in the Index is based on public information and
questionnaires it receives from companies regarding their environmental and social
93. Puri & Kupi, supra note 90, at 222–24.
94. Hart & Zingales, supra note 2, at 263–64.
95. Elhauge, supra note 4, at 739.
96. For an example of a study which assumes that the function of the social responsibility
committee is to “positively impact corporate social performance,” see Edian Eberhardt-Toth, Who
Should Be on a Board Corporate Social Responsibility Committee?, 140 J. CLEANER PRODUCTION 1926,
1926 (2017).
97. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 420, 430 (1991).
98. Eberhardt-Toth, supra note 96, at 1929.
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practices.99 As a company invests more in these dimensions, it will receive a higher
score that will enable it to be included in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index.100
The function of the committee proposed in this Article and the measurement
of its efficacy are different. The committee’s function is to make sure that
shareholders’ voices are heard on social issues and not necessarily that the
corporation should act to promote social objectives. Its efficacy can be measured
by alternative indicators, such as the number of times the committee has passed on
certain issues to shareholders.
These functional differences have an important implication regarding the
desired structure of the committee. For both types of committees, it is desirable that
members will be independent.101 Yet for a conventional social responsibility
committee, it may be desirable that the board’s chair be part of the committee and
that its membership be drawn from the senior members of the board.102 The reason
for this is that the main function of the committee is influencing the corporation’s
decision-making, so it is important that the committee be comprised of the most
influential members of the board.103 This is not the case in the type of committee
suggested in this Article; its main function is not influencing the decision makers in
the corporation but making sure that the voice of shareholders will be heard
regarding certain issues. Thus, the clout of the directors on the committee is much
less significant. Furthermore, it may be desirable that such prominent members of
the board not sit on the committee. Influential board members, such as the
chairman, are less independent than other members. Even if the chairman is
formally independent, he is more susceptible to capture by the CEO.104 Thus, the
degree of influence of board members may be inversely correlated to the degree of
their independence. If influence is not as crucial for the committee proposed in this
Article, it is better that the degree of independence not be traded off for it.
This top-down model does not necessarily decrease the engagement of
shareholders on these issues. While it seems that in and of itself it does not permit
shareholders to independently raise social issues they would like to address, the
model may still increase the impact of shareholders. More shareholders may be
willing to be involved and support a social issue that a formal sub-committee of the
corporation has raised in comparison to supporting that issue in the context of a
shareholder proposal made by an individual who has a personal obsession for a

99. Measuring Intangibles: RobecoSAM’s Corporate Sustainability Assessment Methodology,
ROBECOSAM 8 (2018), https://www.robecosam.com/media/d/0/1/d013178bf9bfae863cbea53a
27584ac1_measuring-intangibles-csa-methodology_tcm1011-15705.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/69WSJA72].
100. Id.
101. Eberhardt-Toth, supra note 96, at 1927.
102. Id. at 1927-28.
103. Id.
104. Bevis Longstreth, Boards Fail When Executives Are Captured, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/8dc26bb4-cf1a-11e5-92a1-c5e23ef99c77 [ https://perma.cc/8ZEEFMJX].
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certain issue.105 This might even be the case when the shareholder is an active
investor, such as a fund, because it is an actor without a formal function in the
corporation. The main advantage of this format of shareholder engagement is that
it sifts out the noise of unserious proposals. The flood of proposals, including those
that are completely superfluous, is one of the major critiques of the shareholder
proposal mechanism, as each proposal necessitates the cost of adding it to the proxy
material.106 The top-down mechanism addresses this disadvantage of the alternative
bottom-up mechanism.
It is possible to combine both mechanisms so they will complement each
other: enable both bottom-up and top-down mechanisms for shareholder input on
social issues. It may seem that the major benefits of the top-down mechanism will
evaporate under such a combination: seemingly it will not eliminate the flood of
proposals, for example. Yet, it may be that instituting a sub-committee that is
supposed to elicit views on social issues will reduce overall shareholder social
proposals, given that a dedicated outlet exists for those views. By appointing a subcommittee whose main function is to oversee such issues, shareholders will be
“relieved” from their “guarding” duty and will not generate such proposals
independently.
The question of which of these mechanisms is more effective and whether
they are actually complementary is an issue best determined by empirical analysis
examining the magnitude of each of the effects discussed above.
IV. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS
There are three main objections to the framework for justifying and facilitating
corporate engagement with social objectives laid out in this Article. The first is that
shareholders may actually be less social than managers. The second is that even if
shareholders are more sensitive to social objectives than managers, they may be too
sensitive, exceeding the socially optimal level of a corporation’s engagement in
social activities. The third is that the delegation of social issues to shareholders will
decrease the possibility to detect potential synergies between social and business
activities.
105. This is supported by the finding that retail investors are mostly pro-management in their
proxy voting. See Jill E. Fisch, Standing Voting Instructions: Empowering the Excluded Retail Investor,
102 MINN. L. REV. 11, 15 (2017).
106. See Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable
Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 177 (2001) (pointing to the fact that the
costs of the proposals are not justified: they have no positive effect—only seldom do they receive a
majority and do not have a positive impact on stock price). In addition to Roberta Romano, proponents
of a director-centered approach to corporate law object to enhancing shareholder proposals or any
other enhancement of shareholder powers. See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing
Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561 (2006); Stephen Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder
Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 623–24 (2006); Stephen Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Choice
and Federal Intervention in Corporate Law, 87 VA. L. REV. 961, 985 (2001); Martin Lipton &
Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company’s Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come,
59 BUS. L. 67 (2003).
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A. Are Stockholders Actually More Pro-social Than Managers?
The argument of this Article is based on the premise that shareholders tend
to be more social than managers. Not all scholars agree with this analysis. For
example, Einer Elhauge argues that dispersed shareholders are less social than
managers.107 The idea is that dispersed shareholders are insulated from social and
moral norms and sanctions, while managers are not. Social preferences are mostly
generated by exposure to these social and moral norms.108 Greater exposure to the
social norms and sanctions that pertain to a certain situation increases the likelihood
that one would take the proper action.109 For example, direct connection with a
worker in poor conditions motivates improving his work conditions. There is a
difference in the social sanction for someone directly exposed to a situation calling
for action and someone only indirectly exposed to the situation. People will view
differently individuals who are exposed to such hardships, have the power to amend
it, and yet do not do anything in comparison to those who have not been exposed
to the situation directly. As a consequence, managers who are more exposed to
social norms and sanctions are more prone to making pro-social decisions. Elhauge
argues that in order to enhance corporations’ engagement with social issues, which
he too believes is optimal, managers should have more discretion regarding these
issues.110 In most cases, a manager’s central function is pursuing shareholder
welfare. Yet, because these social and moral norms and sanctions have an important
role in complementing formal legal norms, managers’ greater exposure to these
social and moral norms and sanctions align their interests in this domain with the
social interest.111
There are two responses to Elhauge’s assertion that managers are more social
than shareholders. The first is that Elhauge’s comparison between managers and
shareholders takes into account only the gap in their pay-offs from social decisions.
Even if one agrees with Elhauge’s analysis regarding that social gap, nothing can be
inferred regarding the likelihood that managers will make social decisions without
an analysis of the gap for the alternative profit-maximizing decision. Even if
managers derive greater benefits than shareholders from social decisions, if they
derive even greater benefits than shareholders in profit-maximizing decisions, they
will still tilt toward profit maximization. What matters is their relative benefits from
the two types of decisions. As explained above, managers derive substantial benefit
from profit-maximizing decisions, due to bonding mechanisms and the
nondiversification of managers’ human capital.
However, Elhauge’s argument poses a parallel problem for the argument in
this Article and to Hart and Zingales’s premise as well. Pointing to the greater

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Elhauge, supra note 4, at 796–805.
Id. at 740.
Id.
Id. at 796.
Id.
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benefits of managers from profit-maximizing decisions does not imply anything if
they may have even greater benefits from social decisions. Furthermore, one can
argue that even in respect to profit-maximizing decisions, the value of such
decisions to managers may be lower than shareholders. If the value-maximizing
decision is regarding a risky project in the far future, its value to managers may be
lower than that of shareholders: managers are more conservative in their risk
preferences because of their lack in diversification. As a consequence, they may
attribute lower value to future risky projects, and may be more willing than
shareholders to trade off such projects for social purposes. The central question is
which of the managers’ benefits is greater in comparison to the stockholders’:
profit-maximizing decisions or social decisions?
The evidence seems to point to the former. Data regarding activist
engagement of shareholders reflects that shareholders mostly press corporations to
enhance their promotion of environmental and social goals, rather than to decrease
their investment in social and environmental objectives.112 From the 916
shareholder proposals in the 2016 proxy season, 299 were aimed at enhancing the
corporation’s engagement in promoting social and environmental objectives.113
Among the environmental proposals, the most common proposals focused on
emissions, especially greenhouse gas emissions, and monitoring the companies’
compliance with the Paris Climate Accord’s goal of keeping the global temperature
increase below two degrees Celsius.114 Other proposals are focused on diversity (59
proposals),115 limiting operation in conflict zones (17 proposals),116 and a
sustainable minimum wage (6 proposals).117 If Elhauge’s thesis that managers
benefit more from social decisions were true, one would expect to find at least a
similar number of proposals in the other direction, in which shareholders propose
scaling down social objectives. However, of the 916 proposals, none are of this
nature. This data regarding proposals is partial—in most cases the majority votes
are against the proposals. Submission of a proposal requires a single shareholder to
execute. Yet one would expect symmetry in the submission of proposals between

112. Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2016 Proxy Season, GIBSON DUNN ( 2016),
https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/documents/publications/Shareholder-ProposalDevelopments-2016-Proxy-Season.pdf [ https://perma.cc/EN8K-MFF7].
113. Id. at 5.
114. Id. at 38.
115. Id. at 42.
116. Id. at 43.
117. Id. at 44. The low acceptance rate of these resolutions does not necessarily represent broad
shareholder views, but rather the decisions of institutional investors, who control over 70% of the
stocks traded. As Scott Hirst noted, there is a significant gap between the preferences of shareholders
and how institutional investors vote on their behalf in shareholder proposals regarding social issues. See
Hirst, supra note 19, at 231. In polls and actual votes, it appears that over 70% of shareholders support
such resolutions, but on average only 27.6% of the mutual funds he examined voted for such
resolutions. See id. at 227, 230. Namely, if votes of institutional investors would have reflected the actual
preferences of shareholders on behalf of which they hold the shares, many more social resolutions
would have passed. See id. at 230–31.
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pro-social goals and pro-profits goals if there weren’t any systemic preference gap
between shareholders and managers.
B. Aren’t Stockholders Too Sensitive to Social Objectives, Exceeding the Social Optimum?
The premise of this Article, as in much of corporate legal scholarship, is based
in shareholder primacy: the corporation, and its management, should strive to
maximize shareholder welfare.118 One of the central justifications for this view is
that the interests of shareholders are aligned closely with the interests of society at
large.119 This theory is a classic case of Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” at work:
shareholders’ maximization of welfare maximizes social welfare at large. But is this
necessarily the case in shareholders’ decisions to sacrifice and not promote their own
welfare? At first glance, the answer to this question may seem simple—the reason
why shareholders are willing to sacrifice their own financial welfare is because it
promotes social welfare. Thus, the decision to sacrifice personal welfare should be
at least as effective in promoting social welfare as decisions to promote personal
welfare.
Yet, some may raise the concern that this is not the case when shareholders
delegate the authority to decide whether the corporation should engage in social
activity that would sacrifice its own profits. In such cases, their decision will not be
aligned with the social optimum because of the rational apathy problem.
Shareholders’ decisions will not reflect a process in which they weigh their costs and
the corporation’s relative to the benefit for society. The extremely low expectancy
that their vote would be decisive in any way may make its economic value negligible
to them, and they may disregard it all together. The value shareholders may derive
from their voting is not outcome based, but participation based: it is not derived
from the increase in the expectancy that their preferred policy is more likely to be
implemented, but from their support of a certain position per-se independent of its
probability of being actually implemented; their subject sense of responsibility.120 A
different version of this argument is that the main source of value of the vote for
the shareholders is its symbolic value, which applies only when they vote for social
issues. In other words, shareholders value their vote as a means for expressing
values to which they are committed. Thurman Arnold has pointed out the
“symbolic” nature to various forms of behavior in the market and its regulators.121
Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock have applied Arnold’s “symbolic” view of market
and political activity to the realm of corporate governance and the functioning of

118. See supra note 8.
119. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 9, at 36–39.
120. Hart and Zingales themselves adopt this framework. See supra note 33. See their
methodological discussion regarding the framework. Supra at 266-70.
121. THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (1st ed. 1937).
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shareholders. In their words: “[T]he battle against managerial agency costs, as
Arnold would say, is a moral crusade, not a practical one.”122
The ramification of this view is that shareholders may make decisions biased
toward social objectives, which may have negative implications for society’s welfare.
Shareholders might be affected by the high symbolic value of their vote on such
matters and vote in their favor even if practical considerations—the social benefits
of the objective versus the corporation’s costs—would caution against it.
However, even if we accept the possibility of “symbolic” activity that is not
motivated by practical considerations in the realm of corporate governance and
activism by shareholders, it should not be a serious concern in regard to
conventional voting. The cases in which Kahan and Rock had discussed shareholder
activism as motivated by symbolic consideration differ significantly from
shareholder voting discussed in this Article. Kahan and Rock have focused on
activist campaigns for abolishing practices such as poison pills and staggered boards,
and the adoption of practices such as proxy access. The success of these campaigns
was feasible, and in many cases these campaigns actually succeeded.123 The symbolic
value was not attached to the attempt to cause a certain outcome, independent of
the chances of the attempt to succeed. The symbolic value was attached to the actual
outcome but over-inflated its actual value.124 In this sense, the symbolic value works
as a second layer on top of a practice that seems at first to be of practical value,
inflating its significance.125 The case of individual shareholder voting is different. It
lacks the first level of the apparent practical importance, and there is nothing to
inflate. In this sense, the degree of irrationality that the symbolic value needs to
justify is much stronger and thus seems less relevant and less concerning.
It is certainly possible that shareholders derive value from the participatory act
per-se, and not from its impact on the outcome. But it may well be the other way
around: that managers derive value from their participation in promoting a certain
goal and not from the value of the goal itself. Prima facie, it seems more reasonable
that a more active action as executed by managers has higher participatory value
than a technical action of voting with limited public salience. In order to claim that
the value to the shareholders stems from participation per-se, one must furnish
evidence that that is actually the case. It is not self-evident at all.
C. Ineffectiveness of Corporations in Promoting Social Goals
Even given that a shareholder can influence a corporation to act in order to
promote a certain social goal, the corporation may not be able to actually promote
the goal. The outcome in respect to the social goal, does not depend only on the

122. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1997,
2036 (2014).
123. Id. at 2022, 2037.
124. Id. at 2036–37.
125. Id.

Final to Printer_Libson (Do Not Delete)

3/25/2019 10:14 AM

2019] TAKING SHAREHOLDERS’ SOCIAL PREFERENCES SERIOUSLY 727
actions of one corporation, but on the equilibrium reached by the actions of all
corporations. Even if a corporation abstains from executing a socially damaging
action, it may not diminish the level of the social damage—other firms may execute
the socially damaging action instead, and the only impact the shareholder initiative
will have is diminishing the revenue of their company. For example, in the Walmart
case, the shareholders’ initiative may not have any impact on the quantity of highcapacity magazines sold, but only on the identity of the seller: instead of Walmart
selling them, some other retailers would sell them. This is another reason why social
goals should be promoted through the political sphere and not through the
corporate sphere: only state regulation can achieve the optimal equilibrium required
for promoting the social goal.
It is true that the political process has many advantages over the corporate
sphere in promoting social goals and in most cases is the appropriate arena for
promoting such goals. The argument in this Article does not claim that promoting
social goals through the corporate sphere dominates promoting social goals through
the political system. It only claims that there may be some cases in which the
corporate sphere may have an advantage. It is true that there are some strategic
problems in promoting social goals through the corporate sphere, such as the
equilibrium problem noted above. But the political sphere pertain failures that
eliminate its ability to promote certain goals—voting in the political process is over
candidates and not over policies and social preference, the need to vote for a bundle
of policies without knowing which coalition will form, and other collective action
problems that the political system exhibits.126 The argument proposed in this Article
enables the individual to determine which of the systems is most appropriate for
promoting her desired goals. If one of the systems is not effective in promoting her
goal, she would most likely not opt for it. In other words, the argument in this
Article enables a private-ordering mechanism, through which the individual will
pick the system that is the most effective for promoting her desired goal.
D. Upstream / Midstream Changes in the Objectives of the Firm
One may argue that even if one accepts the central argument of this Article
and enables firms to promote social preferences, it should be done only upstream—
by being clearly stated at the IPO stage in the charter of the firm as a mechanism
that enables shareholders to influence the firm to promote social goals.. When such
mechanisms are adopted mid-stream, after the IPO, they would harm certain
shareholders that expected that the firm would focus on profits, and now find
themselves losing value.127
126. Regarding breakdowns in the transmission of individual preferences in the political
process, see J.M. BUCHANON AND G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULOUS OF CONSENT: LEGAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); J.M. BUCHANON, WHAT SHOULD
ECONOMISTS DO (1979).
127. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable
Constraints on Charter Amendments or Differential Treatment Between Opting in to a Firm’s Charter, and
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It is true that the proposal would have greater legitimacy if it required the
shareholder mechanisms to be installed at the time of the IPO. But it doesn’t
necessarily have to limit itself in that way. Setting a default where the firm has to
promote profit-maximizing preferences, unless stated otherwise, provides a
significant benefit to such preferences over other preferences of shareholders. The
central argument of this Article is that there is no theoretical justification to
discriminate between the two sets of preferences. It is true that a shareholder that
preferred value maximization and assumed the other shareholders had the same
preference, loses out when the other shareholders promote social goals. But the
same is true to the same extent in the reverse direction: shareholders with pro-social
preferences that assumed other shareholders had similar preferences lose out
potentially to the same extent when the other shareholders pursue only profit
maximization. The main justification for setting one of the sets of preferences as a
default is empirically based, and not theoretically based: as long as one set of
preferences is much more common than the other, it is justified that the
shareholders assumed other shareholders held the more common preference. But
if the dynamic of preferences keeps on shifting, and more shareholders have prosocial preferences, the justification for maintaining for-profit preference as the
default weakens.128
E. Won’t Delegation of Social Issues to Stockholders Decrease the Synergies from
Such Engagement?
One of the primary justifications for corporations to engage in social activity
is the synergies from combining the business and social activities. Each one of the
spheres benefits the other: the business sees reputational benefits such as goodwill
and branding from the social activity, and the social sphere benefits from the
business’s resources employed for furthering goals in this sphere. Knowledge of
when and where these mutual benefits take place is extremely complex.129 While
managers in many cases have the skills to identify these opportunities, it is highly
doubtful that shareholders have this knowledge.130 Therefore, when making decisions
regarding the social issues in which the corporation should engage, shareholders might

Opting out of It in the Post-IPO Stage, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1989) (distinguishing between
shareholders’ opting-in decisions in the IPO stage and opting-out decisions regarding charter
amendments in the post-IPO stage).
128. One may argue that, even if the preferences are equally common, there is still a strong
justification for setting one of the preferences as the default in order to maintain stability and that each
set of shareholder would not find himself in a different company from the one he has invested in. Yet
stability also has a cost—eliminating flexibility and the ability of the firm to adopt itself to new
opportunities and to the evolving preferences of its shareholders which aren’t always stable. One cannot
clearly determine ex-ante which one of the two dominates the other.
129. E.g., Roy Shapira, Corporate Philanthropy as Signaling and Co-optation, 80 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1889, 1935 (2012).
130. Id.
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not fully take these complex synergies into account. As a consequence, social welfare
will be reduced, as many of these potential benefits might not be recognized.
While it is plausible that managers have this knowledge and shareholders do
not, managers can mitigate this gap by informing shareholders regarding possible
consequences—positive and negative—of various social courses of action. Most
likely, such disclosures will not entirely eliminate the gap. Even after receiving such
information, shareholders are unlikely to fully understand the broad picture of each
course of action, and thus will not accurately estimate the potential benefits when
making a decision. Yet, such disclosures will significantly reduce any gap that exists
and the social cost that results, increasing the likelihood that the benefits mentioned
in this Article will surpass this limited cost.

CONCLUSION
This Article developed Hart and Zingales’s argument justifying a corporation’s
pursuit of social objectives from within the shareholder primacy framework. It
underscored the central consequence of the argument for taking into account
shareholder preferences: generating a new agency problem between managers and
shareholders. Managers systematically undervalue social initiatives in comparison to
shareholders and thus will tend toward profit maximization even when shareholders
clearly prefer to pursue other social objectives. This is due to both their
nondiversification compared to shareholders and bonding mechanisms that
increase their sensitivity to profits to a greater degree than shareholders. Hart and
Zingales have raised the concern that there might be a gap between shareholders
and managers in regard to social preferences, but did point out the roots for why
there might exist a systemic gap. This observation has important ramifications: it
increases the importance of delegating more power to shareholders. For this reason,
this Article has analyzed more closely the types of methods through which
shareholder input on social issues could be increased: top-down mechanisms,
through facilitating shareholder proposals, and bottom-up mechanisms, such as
delegation to shareholder vote by an independent subcommittee.
Hart and Zingales’s powerful argument for taking into account shareholders’
social preferences should not be rejected due to the new set of agency problems to
which it gives rise. Rather, this new set of agency problems should be addressed
effectively in order to enable corporations’ internalization of shareholders’ social
preferences.
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